While I stand second to none in my contempt for the odious and oleaginous John Edwards (and I have held him in such low esteem long before it became fashionable), I agree with Kevin Williamson that what he may be indicted for shouldn’t be illegal.
…in science. As I’ve been writing for years, science is a process, not a compendium.
Spirit has finally given up the ghost (so to speak). It had a pretty good run, considering that it was originally only supposed to last a few months.
I have some thoughts on today’s space anniversary at Pajamas Media (and no, neither the headline or subhed are mine — such are the woes of writers subject to copy editors, which is why we have blogs…).
I still haven’t figured out why I do it at all, except someone whom I respect told me that I had to, to be in the twenty-first century. Anyway, here’s a damned good reason not to.
As previously discussed, on the eve of the half-century anniversary of the Kennedy speech that set us off on such a wrong course, Jim Bennett has a piece at The New Atlantis on a proposal for a much-needed restructuring of federal space policy and players.
[Update a few minutes later]
A sample, highly relevant to tomorrow’s anniversary:
Space activity in the United States was almost entirely military in origin: During the early years, most space launches were military — initially reconnaissance satellites, and later weather and communications support systems — and until the early 1980s, even non-military payloads were mostly sent into space on rockets based on military missiles. The civilian space agency, NASA (initially standing for National Aeronautics and Space Agency), was created in 1958 by vastly expanding the existing National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), a small research organization that supported the aviation industry. When NASA was started by the Eisenhower administration, it was envisioned primarily as an overtly civilian shell that would take selected spinoffs of military programs and operate them as a visible civilian program for prestige and demonstration purposes. Meanwhile, the real space program, run by the United States military, would continue to operate in secret as it had since its 1954 authorization. Since NASA’s expected role was minimal, the old administrative structure left over from NACA was deemed adequate — even though the organization had almost no significant experience with large systems management.
In 1961-62, NASA (renamed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to reflect its upgrade) was repurposed by the Kennedy administration to take on a massive development task: creating the Apollo system for manned lunar exploration. The agency also began conducting unmanned planetary exploration, prototyping satellite communications and other commercial activities, launching privately-funded commercial satellites on legacy military-derived launch vehicles, and a variety of ancillary aeronautical and space functions. More or less by default, NASA became a space transportation utility, a de facto regulator, and the de facto American interlocutor in any international space activity.
Apollo-era NASA was effectively an emergency governmental mass-mobilization effort, comparable to Germany’s wartime V-2 program and the Cold War “missile race.” (Indeed, veterans of those undertakings played prominent roles in the Apollo program.) In the case of Apollo, as in the other instances, the head of state was committed to the project, time was more of a constraint than was cost, and the effects of success or failure were quickly felt. However, as NASA moved from the era of Apollo to the era of the space shuttle, the agency’s mode of operation changed dramatically. The primary driver for NASA’s work became institutional self-preservation. Political pressure from Congress and the White House made job preservation a priority. Resource constraints consistently trumped schedule and performance. Shifting goals and pressures made clear accountability difficult to attain.
The cumulative legacy of these transformations — from NACA to NASA, followed by the turn to Apollo, followed by the switch to the space shuttle — is an agency that dominates its sphere in a manner unlike any other in the executive branch. The agency also has unusual lacunae in its management capabilities, with a span of responsibilities always outmatching its span of attention and control; ultimately, these lacunae have harmed the agency’s technical capabilities as well. The agency’s bureaucracy is characterized by very powerful entrenched internal fiefdoms with their own external political patrons giving them effective vetoes over administrative decisions, and a strong sense of privileged authority over large areas of national space activity.
Read the whole thing, though it’s appropriately long.
Harry Reid, who thinks that it would be “foolish” to fulfill his constitutional responsibility and pass a budget (after who knows how many months now), wants to have a show vote to politically embarrass Republican Senators. Well, the House has decided it can do the same thing to the Democrats:
Rep. Dave Camp (R-Mich.), the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, said he had introduced the necessary legislation on Tuesday.”The legislation I filed today will allow the House to reject a clean increase in the debt limit, proving to the American people, the financial markets and the administration that we are serious about tackling our debt and deficit problems,” he said in a statement.
Turnabout is fair play.
This looks like pretty awful parenting to me, if not outright child abuse. Fortunately, kids are pretty resilient to parental stupidity.
Some potentially exciting breakthroughs, using nanotech. This will be a very important technology for space as well.
Remember the Bob Zubrin who cast scorn on the idea of propellant depots?
Well, now he has a new proposal:
Zubrin’s concept is, at its core, a space access subsidy program. Rather than spend billions on new launch vehicles, he envisions NASA instead spending a modest amount of money—he suggested $1.2 billion a year, about six percent of its current $18.5-billion annual budget—buying the most “cost-effective” launch vehicles available. That cost effectiveness would be some function of its price and payload capacity; Zubrin has a particular preference for SpaceX’s proposed Falcon Heavy, which could launch up to 53 metric tons into low Earth orbit (LEO) for as little as $80 million a launch.
NASA would then, in turn, resell that launch capacity to itself, other government agencies, and the private sector, at the artificially low price of $50 per kilogram, or about $2.65 million per fully-loaded Falcon Heavy. Those launches, he said, would take place on a regular schedule, regardless if the capacity on each vehicle is fully subscribed. “You don’t hold the train in the station until it fills up,” he explained. Any excess capacity would be filled with consumables like water, oxygen, and propellant, which could be stored on orbit for use by any interested parties.
In what does he propose to store the propellants, if not depots?
I should note, though, to be fair, that he wrote the PJM stuff a few weeks ago, so it’s possible he’s changed his mind.