Clark Lindsey has a summary of the direction that the new space policy seems to be taking, based on Space News reporting:
/– NASA not likely to get the boost in budget of $3B that the Augustine panel recommends
/– Looking for ways to save money and a Deep Space Option sort of approach with no early landings on the Moon or Mars. Instead, asteroid visits and flybys.
/– ISS will be extended to 2020
/– A commercial crew competition program would get $2.5B as the panel recommends.
[/– Deep space exploration projects would get $1B starting in 2012-2013 time frame.]
/– Will also try to save money by using fixed-price contracts rather than cost-plus.
/– Looking at the possibility of a private contractor operating the ISS
/– R&D will get ~$800M rather that the $1.5B recommended by the panel.
/– Ares 1 will probably be axed. Orion could survive as a backup to a commercial capsule.
/– An amended NASA budget will be submitted to Congress in mid-Sept.
It seems much more promising, and budgetarily plausible, than Constellation ever was. I wonder how, and where, they plan to implement the fixed-price procurements? There’s no mention of robotics, but it would be nice to see some ISRU demos on the lunar surface. If successful, they would provide a lot of leverage for lunar landings. This might be a good prize program — land something on the surface that can generate TBD lbs/hour of LOX (and possibly LH2 as well).
[Update a few minutes later]
Here’s an NBC news report, with complaints about job losses. And Andy Pasztor has a story at the Journal:
A presidentially appointed commission on the future of U.S. manned space efforts is wrapping up a study urging the White House to rely on commercial transportation of both cargo and crew to the space station. The commission, which presented its initial findings to NASA Administrator Charles Bolden and senior White House science aides earlier this month, wants President Barack Obama to revitalize NASA by getting it out of the routine business of shuttle operations: launching to and returning from low-Earth orbit.
Instead, the commission recommends NASA rely on a combination of commercial and government-developed technologies to explore deeper into space. The study group, for example, wants NASA to start working on ways to combat the rigors of cosmic radiation, lengthy travel times and other challenges presented by possible manned missions to nearby planets and outside the solar system.
In the shorter term, companies expected to benefit from the heightened commercial focus include Space Exploration Technologies Corp. and Orbital Sciences Corp., both already working on cargo-delivery systems for NASA. Proponents of the new approach are betting that more competition will emerge as companies see more focus on outsourcing certain missions.
Proponents of the commercial approach also say it would save the government money because companies would use their own funds to develop innovative new technologies and recoup their investments over a longer period by providing services. Such programs also are intended to be faster, more nimble and less bureaucratic than traditional NASA acquisition procedures.
With less than $10 billion annually earmarked for manned space exploration, commission members concluded NASA can’t afford to embark on sweeping new initiatives at the same time it is pursuing plans to return astronauts to the moon, most likely after 2025. One of the biggest decisions facing the White House is whether it is willing to shelve those moon ambitions, at least temporarily, even if that results in industry disruptions and job losses. That would entail ending development of an expensive new crew capsule, dubbed Orion, along with work on certain rocket and lunar-lander projects.
And of course, there is no mention of propellant depots or refueling. I’ll be curious to see what the final report has to say about them. Has there been no discussion of them, or do the reporters not understand their significance?
Also, Keith Cowing seems to have corroboration of Rocketman’s report that Bolden questions the value of the Ares-1X “mission.” And Keith displays the sunk-cost fallacy:
Given that the hardware is in place, and the money has more or less been spent, it would seem to be a total waste to not finish things up and then fly the mission.
What is the value of flying a test of a system that isn’t particularly relevant to the actual hardware when the program itself is going to be cancelled? The money has been spent, and it’s dollars over the dam, but there is still some risk involved in the flight, and I haven’t heard that the Range-Safety Office at the Cape has given the go-ahead yet. Yes, it is a waste of money, but it was always a waste of money. Let’s finally stop wasting the money.