Dennis Wingo remembers Ernst Stuhlinger.
Category Archives: Space History
Soyuz Question
Anyone out there know what they’re using for comm these days? Do they have a TDRSS system as part of the ISS operations agreement? Or something else? Or both?
[Update about 1 PM EDT]
Via an email from Jim Oberg:
Mir used to have a TDRSS-like system called ‘Luch’, and a dish antenna capable of communicating with the GEO relay satellite is installed on the Service Module now linked to ISS.
But it’s never worked. The old system broke down and wasn’t replaced in the 1990’s. There are one or two payloads already built, at the Reshetnev plant in Krasnoyarsk, but they won’t deliver them until the Russian Space Agency pays cash — and by now, their components have probably exceed their warranties anyway.
The Russians have a voice relay capability through the NASA TDRSS, but can’t relay TV or telemetry, so they conduct how-criticality operations such as dockings or spacewalks only when passing over Russian ground sites. They don’t even have ocean-going tracking ships any more — all sold for scrap [one is in drydock as a museum].
Lunar Property Rights
The current state of play, according to Glenn Reynolds. There was a piece on the subject in Sunday’s Boston Globe as well. I wish that Congress would do something about this. It would have a lot bigger effect in the long run than deciding how much to underfund a failed Constellation concept.
Lack Of Confidence
Wow.
NASA is actually considering abandoning ISS until they can resolve the safety issues surrounding the Soyuz currently docked there (and in general).
This whole fiasco reveals a fundamental design (in fact conceptual) flaw of the station from the beginning (one that was shared by the Shuttle)–a lack of redundancy and resiliency. NASA had the hubris to think that they could design and build a single vehicle type that could not only have the flexibility to satisfy all of the nation’s (and much of the world’s) needs for transport to and from space, but do so with confidence that it would never have cause to shut down (and remove our ability to access LEO). They learned the foolishness of this notion in 1986, with the Challenger loss.
Similarly, they decided to build a manned space station, that would be all things to all people–microgravity researchers, earth observations, transportation node, hotel–because they didn’t think that they could afford more than one, and so they have no resiliency in their orbital facilities, either. If something goes wrong with the station, everyone has to abandon it, with nowhere to go except back to earth.
Having multiple stations co-orbiting, with an in-space crew transport vehicle (which could serve as a true lifeboat) was never considered, though the cost wouldn’t necessarily have been that much higher had it been planned that way from the beginning (there would have been economies of scale by building multiple facilities from a single basic design). That would have been true orbital infrastructure.
Instead, we have a single fragile (and ridiculously expensive) space station supported by a single fragile (and ridiculously expensive) launch system, with only the Russian Soyuz as a backup. And because there is no place nearby to go, if there’s a problem on the station, everyone has to come home, and the crew size is thus limited by the size of the “lifeboat,” (which is a “lifeboat” only in the sense that it is relied on for life–in actuality, it’s much more than that. It’s as if the “lifeboats” of the Titanic had to be capable of delivering their passengers all the way to New York or Southampton).
And now we can’t trust the backup, and we have no lifeboat at all.
Now that the ISS is almost complete, it is capable of supporting the Shuttle orbiter on orbit for much longer periods of time by providing power, so its orbital lifetime is no longer constrained by fuel cell capacity. But it’s still not practical to leave an orbiter there full time, because a) with only three left, we don’t have a big enough fleet to do so without impacting turnaround time for the others and b) we’re not sure how long it’s capable of staying safely without (say) freezing tires or causing other problems, because the vehicle wasn’t designed for indefinite duration in space.
So as a result of flawed decisions made decades ago, NASA is in a real quandary. They can leave the crew up there, and cross their fingers that a) nothing goes wrong that requires an emergency return and b) that if the return is required, the Soyuz will work properly. Or they can abandon the station until they resolve the Soyuz issues (something over which they have absolutely no control, and will have to trust the Russians).
Sucks to be them.
[Update a few minutes later]
Not that it solves this immediate problem, but Flight Global has a conceptual rendering of a European crew transportation system (presumably based on the ATV) that could (in theory) be available within a decade.
[Another update]
Here’s more on ATV evolution, over at today’s issue of The Space Review.
[One more thought, at 11 AM EDT]
NASA doesn’t seem to have learned the lesson of Shuttle and ISS, because Constellation has exactly the same problem–a single vehicle type for each phase of the mission. If Altair is grounded, we can’t land on the moon. If the EDS has problems, we can’t get into a trans-lunar orbit. If something goes wrong with Orion, or Ares, the program is grounded. Why aren’t there Congressional hearings, or language in an authorization bill, about that?
Crossing The Rubicon
Thomas James writes that NASA is (with little fanfare) disposing of the tooling to build Shuttle Orbiters.
This doesn’t make it impossible to build new ones–the blueprints probably remain available, and new tooling could be built in theory, but it dramatically raises the (already ridiculously high) costs of building any replacement vehicles. Even if we were to continue to fly the Shuttle, we will do so with a three-vehicle fleet, so we would never get a flight rate higher than the current one (which is the highest it’s been this year since we lost Columbia). Until we lost another one, anyway.
This really is a point of no return.
A Good Old-Fashioned NASA Bash
While this Orlando Sentinel columnist makes some valid points in his criticism of the space agency, he also takes some cheap, and unfair shots.
You know we are headed for a boondoggle when the agency’s marketing division starts up a Web page called, “Why the Moon?”
And the first sentence is, “If you asked 100 people why we should return to the moon, you’d probably get 100 answers — or more!”
Translation: We can’t come up with one good one.
I’d call that a mistranslation. It’s like saying that we shouldn’t have removed Saddam because we didn’t find WMD. It really is possible for there to be more than one reason to do something (and in fact, most decisions are made on that basis–any one reason might not, per se, be sufficient, but a combination of them often are).
It may in fact be true that none of the reasons listed are good (I haven’t bothered to check out the site to see), but one certainly can’t logically infer that from the fact that there are more than one, or even a hundred. But this part is actually a misrepresentation of history:
NASA once took on the mission of providing cheap, routine access to space with the shuttle. Then it took on the mission of building and servicing a space station.
Then came two shuttle disasters. And before the station was even half-built, agency officials began complaining they had no mission and needed to fly off into the solar system.
We still don’t have safe and routine access to space. And now, we won’t have our grandiose research platform up there either.
Which “agency officials” were making such complaints? Can he name names? In reality, much of NASA would have been content to continue to fly the Shuttle, complete the station, and finally hope to get some value out of it, even after Columbia. There are no doubt “agency officials” who, if asked over a beer, would say that would be the best course even now, given the problems with Ares 1 and Orion, and the fact that we have been getting a lot better at launching Shuttles. That was certainly the prevailing agency attitude in 1989, when President Bush’s father announced the Space Exploration Initiative, and NASA sabotaged it both indirectly, by coming up with a ridiculously overpriced program, and directly by actively lobbying against it on the Hill (one of the reasons that Dick Truly was fired).
In general, it’s unfair to blame NASA for what is really a failure of the entire federal space policy establishment. NASA doesn’t establish goals, or make policy (though it will often play bureaucratic games to attempt to influence it).
The space station was the “next logical step” in proposed plans for space, going all the way back to the fifties, based on von Braun’s vision. The problem was that the “logical step” before it was to establish affordable and routine access to orbit. The Shuttle was an attempt to do, but a failed one. Unfortunately, the policy establishment failed to realize this until long after space station plans had jelled into one dependent on the Shuttle (and later, the Russians, which is why it is at such a high inclination, increasing the cost of access).
Yes, NASA “took on the mission,” but it failed at it. And with subsequent failures, such as X-34 and X-33, the nation has learned the wrong lesson–that if NASA can’t reduce cost to orbit, it can’t be done, and we should simply give up on the project, and go back to the way we did it in the sixties. But the failure wasn’t due to the fact that it can’t be done, but rather than it can’t be done the way NASA does things: developing and operating its own systems, for its own uses. Government agencies, by their nature, are not well suited to either developing or running cost-effective transportation systems.
It is understandable and natural to want to maximize the value of something in which we have invested many tens of billions of dollars over the years, and it does seem like a waste to abandon the ISS just a few years after its completion, which took decades to accomplish. But there’s a concept called “throwing good money after bad” in which too many people engage. The fact that we spent a hundred billion dollars on ISS doesn’t make it worth a hundred billion dollars. It may, in fact have negative value, like the proverbial white elephant that costs too much to feed and care for.
The mistake of the Vision for Space Exploration was not in establishing a national goal of moving the nation (and humanity) beyond earth orbit. Such a bold and broad policy statement of our ultimate goals in space was in fact long overdue.
The mistake was in specifying in too much detail the means and schedule to do so, and in the failure to recognize that we never completed the job that was supposed to be performed by the Shuttle–developing affordable access to space. This is a capability without which attempts to open up the frontier will remain as unsustainable as they were during Apollo, and to repeat Apollo (albeit in slow motion), which is essentially NASA’s current plan, is to repeat that mistake.
Yes, the Shuttle was a mistake, as was a space station based on the assumption that it had met its goals, but that doesn’t make the goal of the Shuttle a mistake. Achieving that goal remains key to supremacy in space, for both civil and military purposes, and it has to be done before we can seriously contemplate human exploration and development of the solar system. But to blame NASA for these mistakes is wrong, not just because there’s plenty of blame to go around, but because if we believe that NASA is the problem, we won’t address the other very real sources of the problem, and we’ll continue to make such policy mistakes.
[Monday morning update]
More commentary over at Clark’s place.
Happy Anniversary
It’s been a year since Henry Cate kicked off the Carnival of Space. He’s asking for entries for the anniversary edition:
Fraser Cain, the current organizer of the Carnival of Space, has graciously asked me to host the anniversary edition of the Carnival
of Space.Could you:
1) Consider sending in an entry to the carnival? Send the link to a post about space to:
carnivalofspace@gmail.com. It is helpful if you include a brief summary of your post.2) Encourage your readers to also send in an entry?
You could direct them here.
Only Nine Days Left
Until Yuri’s Night. It will also be the twenty-seventh anniversary of the first Shuttle launch.
Looking at the map, the only Florida party I see is up in Cocoa Beach. Between Palm Beach, Fort Lauderdale and Miami, you’d think that south Florida would be able to come up with something.
Five Years Ago
It’s hard to believe, but it’s been five years since Columbia was lost. I was up in San Bruno at the time, getting ready to drive home to LA. Here was what I blogged about it immediately upon hearing. I think that most of my initial speculation has held up pretty well. Also check though the February 2003 archives for a lot more space commentary from the time. I wrote three related pieces at Fox News (here and here) and National Review in the next few days.
Was this as traumatic and memorable as the Challenger disaster? No, for several reasons. We didn’t watch it live on television, there was no teacher aboard to traumatize the kids, and we had already lost our national innocence about the Shuttle. Still, people might want to post remembrances here.
[Update mid morning]
I’d forgotten about these. Columbia haiku that I and my commenters came up with.
[Late afternoon update]
Clark Lindsey has more anniversary links.
Triumph And Tragedy
I have some thoughts about space anniversaries, over at Pajamas Media.
[Update a few minutes later]
Alan Boyle has a more detailed and humanized history of the Explorer 1 mission. Though I should add, as I say in my own piece, that the belts weren’t “discovered” by the satellite–their theoretical existence had previously been proposed by Christofilos, so finding them was confirmation, rather than a complete surprise.