Here is my take on that silly story about the Obama administration “merging” NASA and the Air Force to keep the Yellow Peril from beating us to the moon.
Category Archives: Space
A Critical Space Technology Issue
Would entry heating from orbit pop a kernel of popcorn?
I don’t really have time to think about it much right now, but the answer is (as is often the case), it depends…
On The Radio
I’ll be on The Space Show tomorrow at 3 PM Eastern (noon Pacific), to discuss Ares, Shuttle, EELVs, alternate architectures, Mike Griffin’s job prospects, etc.
[Monday afternoon update, with a bump]
The podcast is now available.
More Richardson Thoughts
It would be nice to say that I was surprised by Richardson’s…errrr…issues. But I wasn’t.
At all.
For one thing, it was hardly news. But it’s also not like this is anything new. There have been lots of shady behavior and associations with the New Mexico governor, going back to his stint in the Clinton administration. He probably didn’t know why the White House wanted him to find a job for former intern Monica Lewinsky, but unless he was stupid, he had to have figured out (at least after interviewing her) that it wasn’t because she was going to light the UN on fire with her diplomatic skills and encyclopedic knowledge of world affairs (though other types of affairs wouldn’t have been out of the question).
And as I noted a few weeks ago, when a state is characterized by insiders as “Lousiana with chiles,” it’s unlikely that the governor himself isn’t in the thick of the corruption. It also makes one wonder what kinds of deals that Virgin Galactic had to cut, perhaps partly under the table, to get the lease agreement signed. If so, was this really the Great WhiteHispanic Hope for commercial space, in Washington or elsewhere?
Anyway, Jonah Goldberg has some more impressions from his book tour:
With the exception of Bill Clinton, it’s difficult to think of a major politician who has been plagued more persistently by troubling rumors of all sorts. When I was in New Mexico not long ago, it felt like I was visiting Little Rock in the way everyone had a sketchy story, theory or little-known fact. Some was very vague, some of it was clearly over the top, and some of it was quite plausible. My guess, and this is only a guess, is that Obama has dodged a bullet here.
Of course, the question is why did it take so long for the bullet dodging to occur? How did he get the nomination in the first place? Should the president-elect blame it on bad staff again? Why can’t this guy find good help? As a reader at Instapundit writes: “They told me if I voted for McCain, I’d have a President who didn’t properly vet his nominees –- and they were right!”
[Update early afternoon]
Pejman Yousafzadeh has some useful thoughts on a replacement:
The Richardson withdrawal represents a remarkable stumble by a transition process that has been notable until now for its sure-footedness and its ability to garner praise from both Democrats and Republicans for the professionalism of its execution and for the quality of its appointees. It promoted the president-elect to say that Richardson “would have brought to the job of commerce secretary and our economic team great insights accumulated through an extraordinary career in federal and state office,” just before throwing Richardson under the bus. To this comment, my RedState colleague Francis Cianfrocca replies: “That makes me feel wonderful! Hey Mr. Obama, how about picking a Commerce Secretary with great insights accumulated though an extraordinary career in COMMERCE?” It’s not a bad idea. One of the commerce secretary’s responsibilities is to be an advocate for the formulation and implementation of trade policies and nowadays, the political class doesn’t seem to have the first clue how best to conduct trade policy. One would think that with the memory of the misguided Smoot-Hawley tariff — one of the epic fails of the 20th century — still relatively fresh in our minds, we would not veer towards protectionism. And yet, we see that the incoming Obama administration sought to counterbalance the appointment of a pro-free trade United States trade representative in Ron Kirk with the appointment of the anti-free trade — and pro-card check — Hilda Solis to the Labor Department. Given this antediluvian personnel appointment, we need a commerce secretary who has both read and understands the powerful point behind Frederic Bastiat’s most famous parody, but since the president-elect seems determined to choose his commerce secretary from the ranks of government rather than from the ranks of those who actually have firsthand experience with, you know, commerce, I’m not optimistic on this front.
Neither am I. Let’s hope for a surprise.
[Afternoon update]
This CBS report says that Kansas governor Kathleen Sebelius is on the short list to replace him as the nominee. I have no idea what that means for space commerce.
Myths Of Space Policy
Though this MIT report on the future of human spaceflight came out a few weeks ago, I haven’t yet taken the time to read it, other than to read through the summary, which I found underwhelming. Fortunately, Jim Oberg has, and explains why I did in today’s issue of The Space Review:
…it promotes some non-historic and deeply troubling myths of space policy that have led to grief in the past and, if accepted for future decisions, could serve as a roadmap for frustration and disaster.
Fundamentally, the sense of the report remains torn between opposing goals: using space in the “best interest of the United States”, and using space in the best interests of the world as a whole.
First, it falls for the classic wish-fulfillment fantasy that playing nice together in space—forming partnerships on significant space projects—can actually compel terrestrial nations to become more friendly to each other despite deep-seated conflicting goals. Second, the report promotes the view that the cost of large space projects can only be afforded if they are shared by an international alliance—contrary to all experience, including that of the ISS, that splitting national responsibilities for integrated projects makes them more expensive, not less. And thirdly, it promotes a dangerously diversionary and dead-ended theory for the root cause of space disasters such as the loss of the shuttle Columbia and its crew: that there was just not enough money, a factor that can easily be fixed by budgetary largesse. Using such views as foundations for policy decisions in the coming years can only result in more waste, more losses, and a lot more tears.
There are also lesser issues, which can be dealt with in a follow-on review. Fundamentally, the sense of the report remains torn between opposing goals: using space in the “best interest of the United States”, and using space in the best interests of the world as a whole. While not a zero-sum game, “space leadership” does tend to benefit those who have it over those who do not, mainly in curtailing options to the secondary players and compelling dependent status on them for important space functions (think GPS). And while selling a policy aimed at benefiting the paying country (the US) may have domestic political value, too nationalistic a sales job at home could make selling it to potential partners more awkward.
Yes, such reports by academics often have this aerie-faerie, kumbaya quality that is divorced from real history or the real world, as I noted a few years ago. As Oberg points out, this politically correct fetish for internationalism for internationalism’s sake has actually held us back and cost us more than going it alone would have, despite claims (i.e., false rationalizations) to the contrary. But as he also notes, there’s always another danger to these kinds of groupthink reports:
The report’s treatment of spaceflight safety is inexplicably muddled, considering the talent available to the group.
Ignoring the factual inaccuracies, I think that muddling is an almost inevitable consequence of report-by-committee, because it’s always hard to get full agreement and consensus on such things, and it can fall prey to the Committee Effect. I’m wondering how it was actually done. Was it a bunch of inputs that were stitched together, or did one person sit down, take the inputs provided, and try to put together a coherent story? The latter is much more difficult (for that one person) but the former rarely provides a coherent (or consistent or fully accurate) narrative. In any event, like most space policy reports of this kind (see Commission Report, Aldridge), it will simply be put on the shelf to collect dust. Which, in this case, might not be the worst thing.
Bad News For Commercial Space?
Fox News is reporting that Bill Richardson is withdrawing from the Obama cabinet as Secretary of Commerce, probably over his pay-to-play problem. He was perceived by the space community as someone who would provide full support for the department for commercial space, based on his record of supporting space tourism and related ventures as governor of New Mexico. I wonder if the transition team had some backups to go to, or if it will be a while before we know who will replace him?
[Update a couple minutes later]
Jeff Foust is already on the case, with linkage.
Free Fall
As Clark notes, here is a very nicely written piece on parabolic flight and weightlessness. Rare is the reporter (even science reporters) who get the physics right on this, because (as he points out) they get confused by the phrase “zero gravity,” which doesn’t really exist anywhere in the universe. Only one quibble:
Each period of ‘weightlessness’ is limited to half a minute or so; otherwise we ‘zeronauts’ would continue freefalling right into the Nevada desert at 600mph. As it is, during half-a-minute’s power- dive we drop nearly 20,000ft – although inside the plane we are completely unaware of this.
This gives the impression that weightlessness only occurs when you “drop” (i.e., descend in altitude). But it actually happens on the way up as well. In both cases, you are “falling” (in the sense that there is no force acting on you other than gravity). First you fall up, then hit the top of the trajectory, then fall down, weightless all the while, and unable to discern your direction of motion. If this seems counterintuitive, it is. But consider an elliptical orbit. As you approach perigee you’re heading down (toward the earth), and once you reach it, you start heading back up (away from the earth) to apogee, but you’re in orbit, and free fall the entire orbit. A parabola in an aircraft is an orbit that, if continued, would intersect the earth’s surface (which is why it is wise to not continue it). And of course, to be more technical yet, it is only parabolic in an approximate sense (assuming flat earth). In reality, it is a tiny section of an ellipse, because the contents of the aircraft are (briefly) in orbit, within the atmosphere.
I should also note that the phrase “power dive” is also misleading. “Power dive” implies that you are diving with engines at full thrust to get down as fast as possible, but in fact, the engines are barely running above idle throughout (until the pullout). Their only function is to overcome wind resistance so that the aircraft can approximate a cannon ball falling in vacuum.
You Know Your Aspect Ratio Is Too High
…when you need a damper arm between the pad and the launch vehicle.
It reminds me of the walkers that older folks sometimes have to use. For the same reason. This is almost getting to be a bad (and very expensive) joke.
Shuttle, Ares and EELVs
There are some interesting top stories over at Space News this weekend. First, there is discussion of the results of the Shuttle extension study, which says that it would be possible to extend Shuttle all the way to 2015 without impacting Ares development, as long as additional budget was provided. One of the biggest arguments against it is the risk of losing another orbiter:
According to the study, both options increase the risk of losing a crew or vehicle: The two-year extension increases the cumulative risk from a 1-in-8 probability to 1 in 6; extending operations through 2015 increases the risk to 1 in 4. The risk of losing an orbiter or crew on any given mission is 1 in 77, the report said.
I know that in the past NASA has been too optimistic about probability of crew/vehicle loss, but I think that 1 in 77 is probably too conservative now. I suspect that, post Columbia (and resolution of the foam issue and ability to inspect and safe haven at ISS for all missions other than Hubble), the Shuttle is probably as safe, or safer to fly now than it’s ever been. That’s not necessarily an argument not to retire it, but I don’t think that the risk of vehicle or crew loss is a compelling argument against extension, either.
I would seriously dispute this comment from Mike Griffin:
In a Dec. 15 interview, Griffin called reliance on Soyuz “unfortunate in the extreme,” but said NASA needs the $3 billion it spends annually on shuttle to move ahead with the replacement system.
“Every time I have spoken about [the gap] I’ve laid it at the feet of budget,” Griffin said. He emphasized that without an increase in NASA’s overall budget, extending shuttle operations will result in a corresponding delay to Orion-Ares 1.
I’ve got a better set of feet to lay it at — Mike Griffin’s decision to develop an unneeded new launch vehicle, which was not intended within the vision or the budget “sand pile.” He knew what the budget was going to be, but rather than moving out on developing actual exploration hardware, and encouraging private industry to get people to LEO via COTS D or something similar, he decided to take that money and develop Ares.
Speaking of which, he appears to be losing the battle to save it:
Griffin said NASA also explored the possibility of developing a larger rocket based on EELV hardware and systems. “We went through it and we came up with the answer that the EELV-derived solution didn’t save you any schedule, didn’t save you any money, wasn’t that safe, and when you look at going beyond the space station mission to the heavy-lift architecture, was quite a bit more expensive. So it didn’t win on any count,” Griffin said. “At this point I’m kind of wondering what has to happen to have people say, ‘OK, I guess they got it right.'”
No need to wonder, Mike. Here’s what has to happen. Show us the actual results of the analysis, along with the assumptions. Then we’ll be able to decide whether or not “they got it right.” Until you do so, we will remain (appropriately) skeptical. It’s too big a decision, with too many implications for taxpayers’ dollars, and our future in space, to just take your (and Scott Horowitz’ and Doug Stanley’s) word for it.
Finally, there is a story that claims that the Orbital proposal for COTS, which was the highest cost, was also the lowest rated. Given Dr. Griffin’s history (and potentially future) with OSC, this will be sure to raise some eyebrows. Particularly since it looks like Planet Space is going to protest. Charles Lurio notes via email that he has a source who claims that:
…a reason for rejecting Planetspace was that Griffin didn’t want an EELV to be used, since, though the only flights would be unmanned, it would further underscore to people that EELV was a viable alternative to Ares 1.
At the time, it sounded like an extreme story even given Griffin’s mania to save Ares 1.
Now, with the comment in the Space News item that Orbital had, “the highest price and lowest score,” I’m starting to think that the story may be a lot more plausible.
Unfortunately, it may be. He’s really on the defensive.
Clark Lindsey has more.
Death From The Heavens
Was there a major meteoritic strike 13,000 years ago in North America?
That wasn’t very long ago (compared to, say, the sixty-five million years ago that the Yucatan was hit). Evidence continues to accumulate that we get hit a lot more than people have previously imagined. We really need to develop the capability to do something about it. We have technology in hand to do so, but apparently lack the will to deploy it. This by itself is reason enough to make the investment to become a real spacefaring civilization, but pork and maintaining existing jobs remain more important.