Hangar Queen

This is not my shocked face.

“We don’t launch until it’s right,” NASA Administrator Bill Nelson said in remarks on NASA TV about half an hour after the scrub. “It’s just illustrative that this is a very complicated machine.”

Ya think?

I was always amused when NASA would say that the Shuttle was “the most complex machine in the world,” as though that was a point of pride. One of the many stupid things about the SLS design is that it uses hydrogen from sea level to orbit. Shuttle was down for weeks once with a pesky hydrogen leak. This concept combines all of the worst features of the Shuttle with none of the best. But, hey, it creates lots of jobs.

[Tuesday-morning update]

So this ended up being another failed wet dress rehearsal.

I wonder how much pressure they feel to get to orbit before Starship?

[Wednesday-morning update]

The real space race.

Look at who the Chinese are copying. They’re not stupid enough to want to build anything resembling SLS.

81 thoughts on “Hangar Queen”

  1. As Wayne Hale himself put it yesterday: “Use the Shuttle engines, get the Shuttle constraints.”

    1. They apparently reused too many parts…

      I can almost hear the conversation now. “This plumbing is the perfect flow rate to cool all three of the Shuttle Main Engines. Let’s reuse that, too.”

      “But, sir, we put four engines on this rocket….”

      “Why didn’t someone tell me that BEFORE we rolled it out to the pad for launch?!?!”

  2. I watched the countdown from T-05:00:00 on. I was curious to see why they’d scrub. The first major issue was the hydrogen leak.

    From my comments…

    03:16 AM Eastern, T-04:48:00 Update:

    They stopped liquid hydrogen loading with the tank only 7% full, having detected a hydrogen leak at the base of the tail-service-mast umbilical area.

    They’re still loading the LOX tank, and are at 30%, but they can’t go above 50% LOX without liquid hydrogen loaded below it.

    The fuel loading was already an hour behind schedule due to thunderstorms in the area.

    A short while later, regarding the hydrogen leak.

    They’re going to go back to slow fill, then try fast fill again. Fast fill increases the flow rate by a factor of ten, and that transition is when they detected the leak.

    So they’re going to try and resume the fill and see if the leak occurs again.

    But it was around that time that they started talking about the bleed cooling problem with the chill on engine 3.

    Anyway, Kamala’s plane landed at 8:02 AM Eastern and she’s supposed to give a speech at noon.

    She was probably writing her speech on the flight, much like Lincoln composing the Gettysburg Address.

    We choose to return to the Moon in this decade, because it’s time to return to the moon, and this time we’re opening the door for women of color to go to the moon, because it’s time, and they’re ready, and we’re ready, and the moon is ready, and the rocket is ready, or will be soon.

    We choose to do this, and do the other things that we do, because we choose to do things that need doing. And we choose to do these things we do not because they are easy, but because they are hard; and they are hard because some things are hard to do, and it’s the hard things that are hard, but we do the hard things because that’s who we are, and what we do.

      1. Agree. I’ve read enough of her stuff to conclude she might well be un-parodyable. I’m pretty sure I wouldn’t attempt it.

        1. So here (via pjmedia) is some of what she actually said:
          We have people who have been working for decades to do the work that has been about America’s leadership…in terms of space exploration. And today is very much on that path about showing the great work that happens here with these exceptional public servants, these exceptional skilled professionals who have the ability to see what is possible and what has never been done before. How exciting is that?

          “What has never been done before” is my favorite part. For those born after 1972, I suspect they will think it is “mostly true”. It was a great line for a Star Trek intro, but it is far removed from reality.

    1. They do choose to do things that are hard. Someone interested in doing it the easy way would have spent the last decade constantly testing the design of their engine. The constant testing may lead to an assembly line that routinely produces reliable engines that are individually insignificant to the progress of the project. That makes failures easy to absorb. But making failure not an option is hard because you have to guess at the failure, guess how to model the failure, convince yourself that your model shows the design is robust to the imagined failure, and then you have to roll out hoping the sum of your guesses will result in no failures. That’s hard.

      But it is easy when your bank account is unlimited and your boss has proven this by just forgiving loans out of the goodness of his heart. So why worry about doing things that are hard. It is just an excuse to ask for more time and money.

    2. We choose to do this, and do the other things that we do, because we choose to do things that need doing. It is right to choose, that is our right! Something the Republicans wish to deny us! Oh wait, wrong speech, hahaha!

    3. George Turner:

      RE: “We choose to return to the moon…”

      Laughing.

      ” We choose to return to the Moon in this decade, because it’s time to return to the moon, and this time we’re opening the door for women of color to go to the moon, because it’s time, and they’re ready, and we’re ready, and the moon is ready, and the rocket is ready, or will be soon.

      We choose to do this, and do the other things that we do, because we choose to do things that need doing. And we choose to do these things we do not because they are easy, but because they are hard; and they are hard because some things are hard to do, and it’s the hard things that are hard, but we do the hard things because that’s who we are, and what we do.”

      If I quoted all the other funny posts herein, I’d just be repeating all yourselves. The thread speaks for itself. It doesn’t need me to translate.

      iu

  3. NASA
    -“Our spacecraft is the most complex machine in the world!”

    SpaceX
    -“The best part is no part.”

    1. “Simplificate and build in lightness.”
      – Geoffrey de Havilland

      “The best system is the one you leave out of the design. Not only do you save its weight, you save the weight of its backup.”
      – Bill Lear

      1. “Perfection is achieved not when there is nothing more to add, but when there is nothing more to take away.”

        – Antoine de Saint-Exupéry

        (This was the favorite saying of our design project advisor for the national undergrad design competition in my last semester. We won.)

      2. Heh. I used to park in Bill Lear’s parking space at Santa Monica Airport.

        He’s my guy!

        And de Havilland was correct, as well.

  4. The complexity of SLS pales in comparison to the complexity of predicting an actual launch date for it.

  5. Shots fired:

    “If it’s successful, it’s a wave, enough to get everybody excited,” [former Marshall Space Flight Center Director Todd] May said. “It’s also an opportunity for the naysayers of the world to come out. You’ll get the Lori Garvers of the world coming out and going, ‘That’s stupid, just let Elon do it’ or whatever.”

    I can actually visualize Lori’s eye roll when she reads this.

    https://www.al.com/news/2022/08/artemis-moon-rocket-awaits-mondays-first-step-back.html

    1. “Save our phony baloney jobs building and launching one SLS per decade?” …though they are a touch late on the first one.

    2. Whoa did I read this right?
      One of the big moments is ignition of the two solid rocket boosters at 30 seconds before liftoff. “If you start those engines, you’re going somewhere,” May said.

      30 seconds? What are they doing for 27 seconds? Making a smokescreen? Did this comment slip a x10?

    3. I rolled my eyes at that bit toward the end about the SRBs lighting 30 seconds before liftoff. 30 milliseconds, maybe.

  6. One of the many stupid things about the SLS design is that it uses hydrogen from sea level to orbit. Shuttle was down for weeks once with a pesky hydrogen leak.

    I like to think of it as the prototype for a Hydrogen powered economy that California has legally mandated staring in 2035.

    1. You can dance, you can jive
      Having the time of your life, ooh yeah
      Pad that charge, cost overrun
      Milking the Hangar Queen

      Friday night and the lights are low
      Looking out for a place to go
      Where they play the right music, getting in the swing
      Charge expense everything

      Anybody could be that guy
      Night is young and the music’s high
      With a bit of rock music, everything is fine
      You’re in the mood for a dance

      And when you get the chance

      You are the Hangar Queen
      Cost plus, a contractor’s dream!
      Hangar Queen
      Suck that teat like no one has seem, oh yeah

      You can dance, you can jive
      Having the time of your life, ooh yeah
      Pad that charge, cost overrun
      Milking the Hangar Queen

      You’re a teaser, you turn ’em on
      Leave them burning and then you’re gone
      Looking out for another, anyone will do
      You’re in the mood for a dance

      And when you get the chance

      You are the Hangar Queen
      Cost plus, a contractor’s dream!
      Hangar Queen
      Suck that teat like no one has seem, oh yeah

      You can dance, you can jive
      Having the time of your life, ooh yeah
      Pad that charge, cost overrun
      Milking the Hangar Queen

      Milking in the Hangar Queen

  7. This concept combines all of the worst features of the Shuttle with none of the best.

    The Orion capsule isn’t suspended under the rocket like a gondola or strapped to the side. So they missed that worst feature, so you really can’t say *all* the worst features, maybe *most of*?….

  8. How many times can they cycle those propellant tanks from normal to super-cold/high-pressure and back? This was what, the fourth time this particular tank has been filled part way?

    1. I do not think there is a cycle limit. We certainly cycled many ET’s during STS. I recall sitting console many summer days knowing the afternoon launch would be scrubbed due to predictable Florida summer storms. Yet the tank would be fueled and everyone in their places when a storm may enter the exclusion zone at the launch pad, landing facility, or somewhere critical down range.

      I did think we needed a cycle limit because of the foam. While the tanks probably can handle the cycle, the foam was a bit more delicate, and I think the extra cycles added to foam shed during the early phase of flight. That was a big problem for shuttle, but it shouldn’t be as bad for SLS. However, what I want to say is cracks in the foam could also lead to more ice. I can’t say it, because I don’t think it was ever studied to be conclusive. Still, among other problems yesterday was a crack in the tank foam with ice.

      I think you point has a lot of merit, Ed. But at this time, I think NASA would be better served doing a successful wet dress rehearsal without gaming the test than trying to launch again this week. That’s an extra cycle, and they might decide not to do a rehearsal for that reason. I think an extra rehearsal might drive them to caution and have them check over the engine cooling subsystem carefully.

      It is interesting that SpaceX’s exciting pad explosion was from their testing of the equivalent engine cooling system and venting. They just didn’t protect against nearby ignition sources. NASA has learned those lessons long ago with GSE.

    2. 23 times, says Eric Berger. After which, they have to go in and reassess.

      They’ve still got plenty more shots at it. Hope for their sake they don’t need them all.

  9. Having worked through 80% of Garver’s book, I am conflicted. Chalk it up to human self-contradiction. Seems like she worked for all the right things, for all the wrong reasons. No, that’s too pat (ha ha). How to explain? One of your allies thinks you’re an enemy, merely because you’re a conservative white male. DEI trumps all, especially when trying to achieve some of the most difficult technical and sociological objectives in history. So many puns, so little time…

    1. I stopped about 80% the way through with similar conclusions that she supported similar things for wrong reasons. I just got tired of hearing (I have the audio version) the same story over and over.

      On the subject of diversity and empowering women, Garver’s constant messaging on this topic made me realize the book I really wanted to read about “new space” would be from Gwynne Shotwell.

  10. Depending in what’s gone wrong, they may have to roll the thing back to the VAB. If that happens, I’m guessing late this year at the earliest for another launch attempt.

    I dimly recall Rand saying something about SLS having so many clocks ticking (like the short life of the FTS system, which I think expires Sept 6th) and the SRB prop-settling issue (the SRB’s are already well past their use-by date) that anything other than a short-term scrub is going to require rollback, thus making this thing very hard to get off the pad. (Does a rollback count as getting it off the pad?).

    I’ll be delighted if this thing doesn’t fly until 2023. About 5 years ago, I started predicting that 2023 was the soonest it would fly. A friend decided to challenge me to a bet on that (One can of coke) and I’ll have to pay up if this thing clears the tower before Jan 1st (even if it does so in pieces). So, priorities!

    1. As I understand it, since the old Shuttle-era structure was demo’ed, pretty much anything more complex than “This bolt needed tightening” will require dragging the Slow Late System back to the VAB (again).

      1. Ah, thanks JP.

        Hrmmm. There’s been much criticism of SLS regarding it being non-reusable, but perhaps we’re looking at it all wrong, and SLS is, in fact, 99% reusable (Hence, far more reusable than the Falcon 9).

        Here’s my reasoning as to why SLS is over 95% reusable; the entire vehicle can be used again if it leaves the pad in the horizontal, rather than vertical, direction. As things stand now, I expect it to do so about 99% of the time…

    1. Wicked. If Garver ever reads the Bee (which I sincerely doubt), she is now officially PISSED.

  11. On a separate note, I just heard Masten filed for bankruptcy back in July. Did you all discuss this and I just missed it?

  12. Kamala did manage to say a few sentences.

    “We have people who have been working for decades to do the work that has been about America’s leadership…in terms of space exploration. And today is very much on that path about showing the great work that happens here with these exceptional public servants, these exceptional skilled professionals who have the ability to see what is possible and what has never been done before. How exciting is that?”

    I don’t think I missed it by all that much. Truly, she’s impossible to parody.

    I’m not sure what that last part refers to, though. We’ve put a capsule on a rocket before. We’ve launched using Shuttle hardware (SRBs and RS-25s) before. We’ve gone around the moon before.

    1. I don’t know if you watch Gutfeld! on Fox, but you should. One of the regulars, Tyrus, sagely observed that Kamala’s speeches are best heard accompanied by bongo drums, just like the 1950s beatniks doing open-mic-night “poetry”. To prove it, they set a number of her word salads to bongos, and by God, they really do sound profound! (even though bereft of any meaning…)

  13. Looks like NASA is going to try again….on Saturday.

    But is it because they’ve resolved the problem with the bleed valve? Well, not exactly. As Eric Berger puts it:

    Per NASA’s John Honeycutt, it sounds like the SLS rocket’s engine no. 3 temperature issue may be due to a faulty sensor, rather than the engine not reaching its desired chilldown temperature.

    “Replacing the sensor at the launch pad would be tricky. It’s not ideal,” Honeycutt said. Sounds like they’re going to look at all the other data, such as LH2 flowing into engine no. 3, and have a plan to go with a launch without absolutely knowing the temperature of the engine.

    My read on the situation: Honeycutt is the manager of the SLS program. He has a great reputation among engineers I respect. If he feels confident in the temperature of the engine at launch, I respect that. With all that said, if something bad happens, there’ll be hell to pay.

    But I suppose that when you build a new hydrolox launcher out of an old hydrolox launcher that was notorious finicky and fragile, but don’t include anything like the pad rotating servicing structure that allowed you to deal with a lot of the finicky problems without having to roll back to the VAB, this is the kind of risk you might just have to take.

    https://twitter.com/SciGuySpace/status/1564747868174524422

    1. What’s the worst that could happen if the engine isn’t properly chilled prior to ignition?

        1. Would the remaining three be enough to lift the rocket, maybe just burn longer?

          (Heck, would the other three /survive/ the RUD of their sibling, period?)

          1. My guess on what would happen if one RS-25 engine had an explosive RUD; the other engines would quite likely survive, though their plumbing or one or more would likely be fragged. So, my guess is they’d be fine, though have no propellant supply. (As I recall, SLS engine-out contingencies were predicated on a controlled engine shutdown, not an energetic engine RUD).

            At that point, we’d have a new and informative backup mission profile become the prime mission; seeing how many seconds the SLS structure can withstand the stresses of a fulley-fueled stack with only the SRB thrust propelling it. That would create new and exciting beyond-design-margins load paths in the core, especially at the SRB attach points.

            The SLS stack would then most likely successfully perform a divert from the nominal trajectory to a parabolic formation-flight trajectory, and successfully test the accuracy of the projections upon which the range-safety sea-closure areas are calculated.

            Failure is not an option!

      1. The worst that would happen with an improperly chilled engine would be the turning up of noses by the elite at the gaucheness of an improperly chilled anything – which, these days, could result in the internment of all of NASA and possible execution of its most culpable employees (i.e. those having least to do with SLS).

      2. That would potentially be what the commentariat on Ars Technica have termed a “Wickwick event”: the loss of not only an SLS rocket but damage to the support structure as well, potentially doing enough damage to finally put down this shuffling zombie of a program.

      3. What’s the worst that could happen if the engine isn’t properly chilled prior to ignition?

        That it will reach orbit a little low perhaps but within acceptable parameters to allow NASA to complete the mission. Then they accept the sensor variance and proceed to a crewed mission where in fact the engine is not pre-chilled and the stress causes an actual failure on the 2nd crewed mission. And we’ll get to witness firsthand how well the LES works on SLS with no deaths or serious injuries.

        At least this is a pattern I recognize….

      4. I like the mission manager’s response to the question of how cold the engine got. He replied “500 Rankine.”

        My wife and I both got our BS and MS degrees at Purdue (she in Aero, me in ME), and it’s an old joke that Purdue grads can be spotted a mile away by the fact that they give temperature in Rankine. I certainly do. But I looked up Sarafin on Linked In, and he didn’t go to Purdue. Another myth busted…

        1. it’s an old joke that Purdue grads can be spotted a mile away by the fact that they give temperature in Rankine.

          So from where does one matriculate when Sieverts are preferred over Roetgens? Oberlein vs CalTech?

        2. 500 Rankine (40 F) doesn’t strike me as a sensor failure. It strikes me as the temperature you’d have in Florida next to three pre-chilled engines.

  14. Earlier, I mentioned in a response to Ed on fuel cycling the tanks that I think NASA needed to do another wet rehearsal. NASA is faced with an anomaly that has caused a launch scrub and is related to a previous failed test. I’m sure they have data, but otherwise they are making an assumption that it is a faulty sensor. Unlike a test, once this vehicle is launched, there will be no equipment to examine after liftoff as to what the exact problem is they faced.

    If the launch goes well, then they’ll stick to their assumption, but end up spending a lot of money conducting new tests on similar sensors to see if they can get the anomaly to occur again and prove their assumption. They won’t have the original sensor they claimed is faulty to test it. If the launch goes poorly, it is possible an entirely unrelated event occurs, but if an event occurs with the same engine (or near it) as the faulty sensor; they won’t know if the sensor was warning of something else that was critical.

    Almost 2 decades ago, NASA decided it would be too costly and useless anyway to get photos of Columbia in orbit. Over the next couple of years, hundreds of millions was spent to determine if assumptions of what damage actually happened was possible. The photos would have told them and obtaining them would have been far less expensive.

    It’s possible this time NASA has more data to confirm the faulty sensor, how it is faulty, and we can move on. I get the feeling they are uncertain but deciding to move forward under the assumption that the uncertainty is not critical. A good launch won’t remove any uncertainty.

  15. Lessons learned are important.

    Our betters will have to adjust after SLS blows up before orbit.

    Not predicting. Just saying.

    I’m already assumed to be wrong in all my takes on reality.

    Actually being wrong isn’t much of an additional ‘burden’.

    1. GaryMike, SLS can’t blow up before orbit, because doing so would be quite an embarrassment.

      SLS simply will not fail, because “failure” can most easily be avoided via redefining “success”. So, if SLS has a RUD at T+60s, they will say that the mission was mostly successful because most test objectives were achieved. Also, it won’t blow up, it’ll have an anomaly. The fact that the anomaly resulted in a fiery kaboom will go officially unremarked.

      Remember CNN calling a riot “Mostly peaceful but fiery” with a burning building in the background? That’s the kind of thing I expect if SLS has an oopsie.

      1. Larry’s First Law: Anything is possible if you lower your standards far enough.

        Lower your standards far enough and even the SLS can be defined as a success.

  16. We’ve had many expendable rockets, and a few reusable ones, but the SLS may be the first ticket in history to wear out before ever being launched.

    1. “This one is a ‘demonstrator.’

      Instead of selling for list price of $5,000,595, after I talk to my ‘manager’, I think I can let you have this one for 4 billion, 900 million, even.”

    1. They decided not to try again Monday, so they’re going to roll it back. The FTS batteries on the SRB’s have to be replaced. The 12-month stacking clock started on Jan 7th, 2022.

      March 9th Spaceflight Now article

      The joints connecting each piece of Space Launch System’s five-segment rocket motors are certified for one year once booster stacking begins, a clock that began ticking Jan. 7 with the hoisting of the SLS’s left-hand aft center booster segment on top of the booster’s lowermost piece.

      But the 12-month certification limit, a holdover from the space shuttle program, could be extended with an engineering review, according to John Honeycutt, NASA’s Space Launch System program manager at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama.

      Honeycutt said in January engineers planned to make measurements and collect data as ground teams stacked each segment of the Artemis 1 boosters inside the Vehicle Assembly Building. The data could help NASA and Northrop Grumman extend the certification of the rocket motor joints beyond 12 months.

      “That gives us the best opportunity to do some sort of a life extension on the booster stacking in the event that we need that,” Honeycutt said.

      That review sounds like a whistle-past-the-graveyard hand-waving exercise. If stacking four segments had a 12-month limit, due to compression, sagging, creep, and potential crack formation caused by the weight, stacking 5 segments should logically have a shorter limit, not a longer limit. The spitball estimate, without looking at creep curves, would be 9 months for 5-high instead of 4-high, which would put the limit at September 7th.

      But I guess the whole purpose of Artemis I is to take us into uncharted territory, one way or another.

      1. George, I agree with all that you say, save for one thing; it’s a year worse than you think. The SLS SRB stacking date. That article you linked was published in March of 2021, not 2022. The stacking (and thus the 12 month clock) began on Jan 7th, 2021.

        I agree with you that the review sounds like a whistle-past-the-graveyard exercise, especially due to the fact that even if they get SLS off the pad Oct 17th, that’s about 10 months past the expiration of the 12-month certification. And yup, they went the review-and-waiver route.

        Don’t worry though, as I’m sure that NASA has an adequate supply of waiver forms to handle the continued slumping of the SRB prop, no matter how bad it gets.

        1. Yikes! I missed that, probably because my brain rejected it.

          Well, I guess the worst that can happen is a highly energetic motor case rupture on the pad.

          1. Upon reading this all I can think of in response is they’re fixing this situation by putting a 2nd round in the revolver.

            Maybe instead if they just stack the waivers high enough an object can be placed in orbit simply by letting go at the summit?

          2. George, your brain rejected it because you’re afflicted by logical thinking. 🙂 It’s just too preposterous to be real. I only caught it because I knew of the stacking issue last year.

            I did a bit of digging after my post. Seems there’s two main issues with leaving the boosters stacked; one is prop slump, and the other is the J-seals between the booster segments. Regards the latter, there are apparently two issues; one is that slumping prop can cause pressure on the seal (postentially causing it not to seal) and the other is that the material of the seal has to remain resilient, and there are time limits on that.

            It’s worth remembering that Challenger’s disaster was caused by a bad J-seal (the O-ring). That joint was redesigned post-Challenger to have 2 O-rings, but they still have to be resilient enough to deal with SRB flexing.

            How much worse SRB flexing will be with 5-segments is somewhat unknown, because the 5-segment SRB has only been tested horizontally.

            BTW, I found that a reporter did ask (sometime early this year) about the waiver until July (2022) and asked if that was a hard date. The NASA spokesperson replied that they were “Good until the end of the year”. That indicates to me that their “review” found that Dec 2022 was as far as they could push it.

            So, what happens if the launch date slips (after another try or two) to 2023? I think they’ll most likely give it another waiver.

        2. What was the term used in the accident investigation after the Columbia accident? Normalization of deviance, IIRC. How many other waivers have been granted for SLS? What other rules are they willing to overlook?

          1. What other rules are they willing to overlook? One that comes to mind is mentioned upthread; going for launch with what they suspect (but do not know) is a faulty sensor (that they think caused the chilldlown issue with engine #4 on the first launch attempt) because it’s not feasible to change it on the pad.

            It’s worth noting that that sensor, if it failed, did not do so in a normal way (going offscale low or high).

  17. The funny thing is, the faulty sensor won’t be on future SLSs. It’s just part of the testing regime. The real test for engine chilldown involves seeing whether LH2 is dribbling out. Reminds me of the Soviets’ original test for whether an R7 was fully lit, by stretching a wire across each of the engine bells. If the signal stopped, there was fire coming out. I don’t know if that was just the 20 main combustion chambers, or whether it included the 12 verniers too.

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