Category Archives: Space

An Incoherent Mess

Congressman Ruppersberger (D-MD) has an op-ed piece in the Baltimore Sun on space policy. Here’s his bottom line:

To give up our quest for the moon, Mars and beyond is not what is best for America’s space program. We need a new road map. We must commit to return to the moon through a program run by NASA in partnership with private companies that will invest in bigger, American-made engines to get us to the moon without relying on Russia. This plan must reinvigorate our space industrial base and inspire people, especially younger generations, to dream about our future in space.

While I sort of agree with this, it’s hard to see how he gets there from everything that came before. And what does he mean by “American-made engines”? Does he think that lack of engines is what’s keeping us bound to the planet? Is he referring to the fact that Atlas uses Russian engines? Is he aware that SpaceX has “invested in bigger, American-made engines,” and wants to build bigger ones yet? It’s hard to know.

The entire piece is full of vague allusions and non sequiturs like this. For example:

Today, America is slipping. The president announced plans to cancel Constellation, the plan to return astronauts to the moon by 2020. This move jeopardizes an $11.5 billion investment, puts thousands of skilled scientists out of work, and shakes the very heart of the space industrial base.

Kids aren’t growing up wanting to be astronauts. China is pumping money into its space plan and setting its sights on a moon landing by 2020.

The implication was that Constellation was actually going to return astronauts to the moon by 2020. Is he aware that this was unlikely to happen before 2030? Is he aware of the Augustine report at all? In complaining about the “investment,” is he familiar with the sunk-cost fallacy? Does he know very few of the people being laid off are “scientists” (perhaps none of them, in fact)? Where is the evidence that China is “pumping money in its space plan” or that it plans a moon landing by 2020? Landing what? People? No way, Jose. Maybe a robot, but so what?

And what does any of this have to do with kids growing up wanting to be astronauts? And why would we want them to? Given NASA’s trivial plans under Constellation, the vast majority of them would be disappointed.

He non-sequiturs on:

Satellites keep us safe. They globally track suspected terrorists, stop future attacks, and provide real-time data to our troops on the ground. At home, satellites allow us to operate GPS systems and cell phones.

None of this has anything to do with NASA, or astronauts or human spaceflight, or Constellation. Then he starts to reminisce:

Four years ago, I took over as chairman of the Technical and Tactical (T&T) Intelligence Subcommittee. We found undisciplined program management and skyrocketing costs, outdated export controls, no comprehensive space plan and inadequate spacecraft launch capability. We were giving Russia and China a head start. I feared that without swift action, the United States would never recover. We immediately started to work to maintain America’s dominance in space.

We passed several measures to ensure better oversight of satellite programs. In the fiscal 2010 Intelligence Authorization bill, we included a measure that forces programs to come in on time and on budget or face immediate cancellation unless critically important for national security. We encouraged agencies to only invest in space systems with proven technology to prevent costly delays when research and development is conducted on the spot. We also promoted greater collaboration between different agencies, sharing technology and saving money.

Well, that all sounds nice but, again, it has nothing to do with NASA and Constellation, or human spaceflight. And if he thinks these were good things, then he should have been leading the charge for the cancellation of Constellation, because it was far over budget and even farther behind schedule, and has nothing to do with national security, let alone being “critically important” for it. He goes on:

We relaxed the export regulations that stifled the American space industry and caused it to shrink to half of its size. The House passed language to ease burdensome restrictions when satellites and components are widely available and do not pose a national security risk. The bill stalled in the Senate, but the exposure got the attention of the Obama administration, which is reforming the regulations. This will allow U.S. space companies to sell globally and offer better products at lower prices here at home.

How did they “relax the export regulations”? As he said, the bill stalled in the Senate, and while the administration has made some noise about ITAR reform (I assume that’s what he’s referring to here, but as with much of the piece, it’s hard to tell), I don’t think that anything has actually happened yet.

Less progress has been made creating a long-term plan for space. While other countries see costs drop, the U.S. is spending more per rocket launch and battling more delays than anywhere else. That is because the United States has committed to a two-company alliance to handle all launches, despite the fact that other U.S. companies are showing promise. Commercial capabilities must be considered in certain cases, including launching earth observation satellites, transmitting images, and traveling to the International Space Station.

Ironically, the United States will soon rely on Russia to provide transportation for our astronauts to the Space Station. When the last shuttle launch takes place this year, the United States will have to pay Russia to bring American scientists to the Space Station. This must change.

What other countries are “seeing costs drop”? He doesn’t say. And are our costs high because of ULA (I assume that what he’s referring to with the “two-company alliance”)? Is he unaware of the existence of Orbital Sciences? I like the line about considering commercial capabilities — I assume with regard to the ISS travel, he’s referring to commercial crew? But why is he complaining about paying Russia? That was cooked in the day that Mike Griffin decided to waste billions on unneeded new rockets, half a decade ago. Did he complain then?

I wonder if he wrote this himself. If not, he should can the staffer that wrote it. I sure can’t tell what it is he proposes to do from it.

Happy 1/1/11

And of course, early this morning, it was 1:11:11, and then, ten hours later, 11:11:11 on 1/1/11.

Anyway, I have a space bleg. I have a vague recollection of a chart that shows all of NASA’s failed attempts to develop a new launcher over the past decades. Does anyone else know about it, and how to find it?

Rocket To Nowhere

Fox News (not just the on-line edition) has picked up the story now. Tom Jones garbles it a little, though. Congress has in fact passed a law redirecting NASA — the authorization bill that passed in September. The problem is that they haven’t followed through by either passing a new appropriation bill to allow them to implement it, or even do an anomaly on the current continuing resolution that allows NASA to move on to the new track. In fact, Congress has essentially made it impossible for NASA to follow “the law,” because it has two intrinsically incompatible laws in place. The notion that this is either NASA’s or the White House’s fault is ludicrous. While minor compared to the other legislative atrocities of this session (stimulus *cough* obamacare), it’s just one more symptom of perhaps the most dysfunctional Congress in history. The question is, what will the next one do to fix it?

More People Are Noticing The NASA Problem

Fox News has picked up the story on the rocket to nowhere:

Stifled by legislative bottlenecks, NASA will be forced to continue an already defunct rocket program until March, costing the agency half a billion dollars while adding more hurdles to the imminent task of replacing the space shuttle.

It’s always useful to note that half a billion dollars is about what SpaceX has spent to date on: creating a company, purchasing/leasing/modifying test, manufacturing and launch facilities, developing from scratch and demonstrating engines, two orbital launch systems, and a pressurized return capsule. This is the difference between NASA doing a traditional cost-plus procurement versus a fixed-price one. And it’s not just SpaceX — we’ve seen similar rapid, cost-effective progress from Boeing on their fixed-price commercial crew contract.

And of course, Shelby’s spokesman says that it’s NASA’s fault:

Shelby’s office says that there is no reason NASA can’t move forward.

“NASA is just making excuses and continuing to drag its feet, just as it has done for the past two years under the Obama administration,” Shelby spokesman Jonathan Graffeo said Wednesday.

As I note here, this isn’t NASA’s fault — it’s the fault of a Congress that has set them up to fail. They have two contradictory laws, and they can’t obey one without disobeying the other, so it’s inevitable that they will be acting illegally until Congress fixes it.

How Many NASA Engineers…

…does it take to screw in a bolt? From comments here:

Take a generic piece of Criticality 2 hardware:

1) First there needs to be a released, CM-controlled drawing signed off by (among others) a stress analyst who does calculations to ensure that the bolt is not being over- or under-torqued. The drawing must be referenced later by the technician to verify the proper torque range of the bolt.

2) Then a project engineer needs to write a Task Performance Sheet (TPS) that is no fewer than 4 pages long that documents, in excruciating detail, which bolt to tighten, what tools to use, the exact locations of every piece of hardware involved throughout the entire process. The part numbers, serial numbers, and lot numbers of every part involved are recorded on the TPS. (The work instruction document defining the TPS process is 55 pages)

3) The TPS needs to be signed by the Project Engineer, his/her manager, and two Quality Engineers (who designate “Mandatory Inspection Points – MIPs – where a Quality Assurance Specialist needs to monitor the process); additional signatures (e.g. stress or materials experts) may be needed depending on the job. Then a Quality Assurance Specialist looks over the paper, approves it, and sends it to the Quality Assurance Records Center (QARC) where it is scanned, copied, and then placed in a basket to be worked.

4) Oh, we need the bolt, too. The bolt has to meet certain quality and reliability specifications, so it is purchased from an approved vendor and is most likely a MIL-spec part. When the vendor ships the part, it must be traceable by lot or serial number and accompanied by a Certificate of Conformance (CoC). The Receiving department will open the package, inspect the parts and make sure the CoC is present. Then some percentage of bolts from that lot of bolts will go to the Receiving Inspection and Test Facility (RITF) and be tested to ensure that the bolts actually meet the MIL Specs (in spite of the CoC being present). Then the RITF report is attached to the lot of bolts, with the CoC, and they all go to bonded storage.

5) The Project Engineer takes the TPS to the bond room, and someone pulls the bolt off the shelf, then a QAS makes sure that the proper part was pulled and that the CoC and RITF report are indeed attached. The parts are labeled and bagged and the Project Engineer is called to pick up the paper and part.

6) These get walked to the work area, then the Project Engineer rounds up two QASs and a union technician who has received special training on how to tighten bolts (no joke). The technician gathers the calibrated tools.

7) The technician tightens the bolt and records the tightening torque on the TPS. The QAS and NT QAS stamp the TPS to verify that they witnessed the bolt being torqued. (While the bolt is actually being tightened, 3-4 people are present watching.)

8) The Project Engineer and one of the QASs will take the hardware back to the bond room or wherever it needs to go. If the hardware is going back to the bond room, it has to be cleaned and sealed in a bag first.

9) The Project Engineer takes the TPS back to the quality office, where one or two QASs will go through the document and make sure that all of the required information was recorded and each step in the process was stamped or signed by all of the required people. Then the QAS will stamp the TPS “closed” and send it back to the QARC office, who will scan and copy it again.

I’m not going to debate the wisdom of any of these steps; any one of them are defensible in some instance. But I count around a dozen people immediately involved in the process and in general I’d say it takes a couple of days, assuming none of the required people find something they view as amiss. I’ll also point out that this is the process, as I understand it, as of today; every few weeks someone will get a wild hair up their ass and add another requirement.

In all fairness, though: I’m fairly confident that most of these people don’t make $100k a year. If they do, I need to have a talk with 4 of my managers about my salary 🙂

Every one of those procedures evolved as a response to some kind of mishappening, and they’ve accreted over decades, but if you want to know why NASA programs cost so much and take so long, there you go. And despite all of that, they destroyed two orbiters that cost a couple billion each to build, and shut down the program for years. So even when failure isn’t an option, failures occur. What is needed is an attitude that failures must be allowed for the program to succeed. The other related attitude that’s required is that what we’re doing is important, which allows the taking of risk.

[Update a couple minutes later]

I would note that one of the reasons that SpaceX can avoid a lot of this quality acceptance stuff is that they manufacture so much in house, and are vertically integrated, as a result of the fact that they couldn’t find contractors who were responsive to their needs in terms of price and schedule. The traditional NASA/AF way has bred a culture among the lower subcontractor tiers that isn’t useful for those trying to lower costs. We need to replace the existing infrastructure with more nimble players. The growing new space industry will help make that happen, but it won’t happen overnight.