Category Archives: Space

Assembling The Station

Here’s a nice animation of ISS assembly. One of the most tragic things about the current approach to the Vision for Space Exploration is that it completely ignores all of the experience gained in orbital assembly over the past decade, instead reverting to Apollo on Geritol.

[Update a couple minutes later]

What a coincidence. I just got an email titled “Gee, Scolese Sounds Like A Critic Of ESAS” (I don’t know if the sender wants to be attributed):

I’m watching the Appropriations hearing, and in response to a question from Chairman Mollohan re plans for moon exploration, etc… Scolese talks about ISS as an example of success at assembling complex systems in LEO and that he would like to see NASA come up with an architecture to build things and then go explore.

Gee. What a concept.

You’ll have to get the transcript, but it sounds pretty treasonous…

At this point, just making Scolese the formal administrator is sounding pretty good to me.

[Update early afternoon]

Rob Coppinger is live twittering the hearing (not a permalink). And he has some thoughts on Scolese’ testimony as well:

In an extraordinary exchange between NASA acting adminisrator Christoper Scolese and the US House of Representatives’ committee on appropriations’ subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies chair, Scolese said that the agency was still working on what “return to the Moon” meant and whether that was a outpost, which he went on to describe as expensive, or an extended sortie like Apollo

So much for Apollo on steroids…

Let’s hope.

[Late afternoon update]

Here’s more extensive coverage of the testimony:

“We were looking at an outpost on the moon, as the basis for that [2020] estimate and that one is being revisited,” he said. “It will probably be less than an outpost on the moon, but where it fits between sorties, single trips, to the moon to various parts and an outpost is really going to be dependent on the studies that we’re going to be doing.”

“Recall [that] the Vision [for Space Exploration] was not just to go to the moon as it was in Apollo, it was to utilise space to go on to Mars and to go to other places,” he added. “We’ve demonstrated over the last several years that with multiple flights we can build a very complex system reliably – the space station – involving multiple nations…and we’ll need something like that if we’re going to go to Mars.”

Scolese’s further comments hinted that the agency’s plans might shift to include a greater emphasis on destinations beyond the moon. “So what I would like to see from NASA over time is an architecture that…will give us flexibility for taking humans beyond low-Earth orbit and allowing us to have options for what we can do at the moon as well as other destinations…[like] Mars or an asteroid…so that there are options on what we do in 2020,” he said.

Good news, bad news. The good news is that (as noted up above) he’s more interested in building an in-space infrastructure than Mike Griffin ever was. The bad news is that he’s backing off from the commitment to a lunar outpost. On the other hand, the in-space infrastructure may allow a revisiting of that issue if it can be shown to reduce the costs of lunar operations. And ESAS would never have allowed an affordable lunar outpost in any event. The activity rate would have been far too low.

[Bumped]

The Suborbital Space Race

Doug Messier has an analysis of the differences between Virgin Galactic and XCOR’s approach to commercial human spaceflight. A couple nits:

A year after the accident, Scaled brought in SpaceDev to assist with the engine development. The Powoy, Calif.-based company had built the propulsion system for SpaceShipOne, but Scaled subsequently decided to bring the engine development in-house. Bringing back SpaceDev was a tacit admission that this decision had not been a wise one.

It’s not quite that simple. There is some dispute as to who the actual engine provider for SS1 was, and SpaceDev certainly didn’t do it on its own. And one reason that they didn’t get the follow-on work was a rumored falling out between Burt Rutan and Jim Benson, founder and then-head of SpaceDev. In addition to the accident, I would assume that one of the reasons that SpaceDev and Scaled are working together again is a result of Jim’s departure from the company almost three years ago (subsequentprior to his recent death).

Also,

XCOR’s gradual approach – flying a small vehicle commercially, then building something larger – is what Scaled Composites might have done absent the involvement of Virgin Galactic. Branson’s company brought the customer experience to the forefront, which led to the development of a much larger – and more complicated – space plane.

It’s not at all clear what Scaled would have done (if anything) absent Virgin’s involvement. It’s unlikely they would have operated the vehicle on their own — that’s not the business they’re in, and they wouldn’t have developed it any further with their own money, because that’s not what they do. They build airplanes to other people’s specifications. Perhaps if Branson hadn’t stepped forward, Paul Allen might have started a passenger business, but we’ll never know now.

Not Guilty?

There is evidence that the asteroid that created the Chicxulub crater didn’t wipe out the dinosaurs:

New clues at other sites in Mexico showed that the extinction must have occurred 300,000 years after the Chicxulub impact and that even larger asteroids may not be the purveyors of doom they’re thought to be, according to a paper published in the Journal of the Geological Society by researchers from Princeton, New Jersey, and Lausanne, Switzerland.

“We found that not a single species went extinct as a result of the Chicxulub impact,” said Gerta Keller, a professor of geosciences at Princeton University, in a release distributed by the Geological Society of London. “These are astonishing results.”

Maybe. But even if true, it’s not an excuse to ignore the problem. Being hit by one of these things will mean a bad day, and maybe a bad decade, depending on its size and strike location. Tonguska was only a hundred years ago, and if it were to hit a populated area (e.g., the eastern Seaboard) today, it would be more devastating than a nuclear blast (minus the radiation), potentially killing hundreds of thousands of people. Even if it didn’t wipe out species, you can bet that anything that can create a crater over a hundred miles across wiped out a lot of life. We should still be investing a lot more than we are to become spacefaring, and prevent a repeat.

And what’s frustrating is that we wouldn’t even necessarily have to spend more money. We’d just have to spend NASA’s budget smarter. But that wouldn’t keep the jobs in the right districts.

[Update a few minutes later]

I wonder if this topic will come up at the Planetary Defense Conference. Looks interesting — wish I could attend. A. C. Charania is blogging it.

[Update a few minutes later]

Or maybe we shouldn’t waste all this money on planetary defense, and just get the president to apologize and make peace with the solar system.

NASA Administrator Update

Jeff Foust has a good roundup of the critical issues that are becoming more urgent (what to do about Shuttle and Constellation) and the current rumors.

[Update a few minutes later]

Here’s a lot more from Chris Bergin. This seems like great news, if true:

General Peter Worden, Director of NASA’s Ames Research Center (ARC), will also spearhead a NASA review, which is deemed to have “wide scope” – likely to include shuttle extension – while a main body “Blue Ribbon Panel” will work with the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in Washington, possibly overseeing all of the studies.

Jim Muncy was hinting at this a couple weeks ago at Space Access. What I don’t understand is what’s been taking them so long to get this under way. It could have happened back in February, and they’d be done by now.

Bad PR, In My Opinion

Scaled has issued a press release in response to Rob Coppinger’s speculations about Monday’s rudder-dragging incident that raises new questions. What do they mean when they say:

…you should question the motivations of a publication that reports design or flight test information that is based only on speculation.

Why should we question them? What will it gain us to do so? What “motives” are they implying here?

Also, my understanding is that Rob posted this at his blog, which presumably has less rigorous standards than a Flight Global article, and is exactly the place to do the same kind of speculating that we all were (though I didn’t blog about it).

This seems like an unjustified slam at Rob, with no basis, other than that they’re upset about his speculations. I doubt if it will change his reporting or attitude toward Scaled in the future, but this doesn’t seem like very good press relations to me, and I just don’t understand their purpose in doing this. As Clark says, it would have been a lot better had they left off that last sentence. Also, as Jeff says, that’s why they call them “test flights.”